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Abstract
This meta-analysis examines the role of trust in marketing channels. First, the analysis of pairwise relationships involving
trust indicates that trust, on average, exhibits a robust and strong relationship with other channel relationship constructs
under a wide range of different conditions. Next, we explored systematic patterns of variation in the correlations. The results
demonstrate that the use of experiments, samples drawn from multiple industries, and US data tend to produce larger effects
than the use of field studies, samples drawn from a single industry, and European data respectively do. Various other
methodological characteristics of studies did not have significant effects. Finally, we examined the role of trust in a
nomological net, involving some of the most frequently studied antecedents and consequences of trust. We find that trust
contributes to satisfaction and long-term orientation over and beyond the effects of economic outcomes of the relationship.
Both trust and economic outcomes—not just one or the other—are conducive to relationship marketing success. q 1998
Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In many industries, interfirm relationships are un-
dergoing a fundamental change. Firms are increas-
ingly looking to have fewer but more intense rela-
tionships with their channel partners. This trend is
driven by both efficiency and effectiveness concerns.
) Corresponding author. Tel.: q32-16-326956; fax: q32-16-
326732; e-mail: inge.geyskens@econ.kuleuven.ac.be.
1 This paper was submitted, underwent blind review, and was
accepted for publication during the editorship of John Saunders.
By concentrating on fewer suppliers for their inputs
and fewer channel members for distribution, firms
believe that they can reduce system costs through the
 .adoption of technologies such as Just-In-Time JIT
 .and Electronic Data Interchange EDI . For example,
it is estimated that such cooperative systems between
manufacturers and retailers could squeeze US$30
billion and US$33 billion in excess costs out of the
US and European food industry, respectively Kumar,
.1996 . Fewer partners can also help motivate suppli-
ers to become more involved in the firm’s new
product development efforts and motivate channel
partners to develop joint marketing programs Johan-
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.son and Mattson, 1985 . However, such exclusive
relationships also increase the firm’s vulnerability to
opportunism by partners. Trust is therefore consi-
dered an essential ingredient for such relationships to
realize their full potential. The partnership between
Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble in the United States
is an example of the power of trust in transforming
channel relationships and unleashing the benefits of
 .partnerships based on trust Kumar, 1996 . Similarly
in Europe, Albert Heijn and Heineken, as well as
Marks & Spencer and its suppliers have developed
relationships based on mutual trust.
Recognizing the importance of trust a decade ago,
 .Dwyer et al. 1987, p. 28 implored that ‘‘trust
deserves priority attention’’. Since the Dwyer et al.
 .1987 article, researchers in marketing have increas-
ingly incorporated trust within their empirical mod-
els of channel relationships. Table 1 includes 24
studies which have empirically examined the an-
tecedents andror consequences of trust in marketing
channels. These studies have examined over 60 con-
structs in attempts to determine how trust is created
and how it affects other relationship outcomes.
Clearly, the overwhelming emphasis has been on
developing and testing new theory, rather than on
establishing empirical generalizations. Thus, despite
this extensive research, no consensus has been estab-
lished about the relationship between trust and other
 .variables. The problem, as Barwise 1995 recently
observed, is that while most research in marketing is
empirical, little of it even attempts to establish any
generalizations. Given the importance of the con-
struct and current status of research, we believe that
a comprehensive mapping of the research on trust is
worthwhile.
At least three issues can be identified that should
be addressed. First, the increasing proliferation of
constructs that are being related to trust calls for
conclusions regarding the current status of trust re-
search, as well as for recommendations with respect
to directions for future research. Which constructs
have been studied so extensively in relation to trust
that more research effort is unnecessary? And which
variables have been neglected? Which constructs
have consistently proven to be strongly related to
trust, and for which have the magnitude of relation-
ships involving trust been small, or even null? Sec-
ond, trust has been examined in a variety of research
environments with diverse methods and measure-
ment instruments. It is crucial to understand which
methodological decisions can impact results and
which do not. Third, while the central role of trust in
relationship building and maintenance has often been
noted in the marketing channels literature, with the
 .exception of Morgan and Hunt 1994 it has seldom
been explicitly examined. It remains to be estab-
lished whether the findings of Morgan and Hunt
 .1994 concerning the mediating role of trust are
generalizable across the research stream, and whether
plausible alternatives regarding trust’s central role in
channel relationships can be ruled out.
To shed light on these issues, we propose to use
meta-analysis—a powerful technique for quantita-
tively integrating research findings across a number
of individual studies. While meta-analysis has often
been employed in marketing e.g., Assmus et al.,
1984; Brown and Stayman, 1992; Churchill et al.,
.1985; Tellis, 1988 , to the best of our knowledge, it
has not been applied in the channels area.
 .Through meta-analysis we aim to: 1 reflect on
 .the definition of trust, 2 map the constructs that
have been examined empirically in relation to trust,
 .3 reveal which of these constructs exhibit a strong
 .relationship with trust, 4 demonstrate which
 .methodological choices matter and which do not, 5
test a causal model which posits a key mediating role
 .for trust in marketing channel relationships, and 6
identify areas for future empirical investigations of
trust.
The next section describes the research domain
and specifies a number of characteristics that may
influence the strength of the relationship between
trust and other variables.
2. Literature review
2.1. Selection of studies
Empirical studies appearing in the marketing liter-
ature investigating trust in channel relationships were
identified by means of a computer bibliographic
search and issue-by-issue searches of the AMA Pro-
ceedings, EMAC Proceedings, International Journal
of Research in Marketing, Journal of Business Re-
search, Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of
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Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal
of Retailing, Marketing Letters, and Marketing Sci-
ence. The literature search covered the 1970–1995
period. In all, 24 empirical papers containing 27
independent samples were uncovered. A table of the
studies and their principal features is presented in
Table 1.
 .An examination of Table 1 reveals that: a the
large majority of studies were field studies, only
 .seven being experiments; b the samples were drawn
from five countries, although more than 75% were
 .conducted in the United States; c about 70% con-
sidered distribution channels for consumer products,
and the remainder studied distribution channels for
 .industrial products; d the majority consisted of
commercial channel members retailers, wholesalers,
.  .or manufacturers as opposed to end users; e a
minority of studies sampled multiple industries; and
 .f about 80% of the samples focused on the buyer
 .side e.g., dealer reporting on supplier and 20% on
the seller side of the dyad e.g., supplier reporting on
.distributor .
2.2. Definition of trust
Inspired by interpersonal research Deutsch, 1958;
.Larzelere and Huston, 1980 , most channel studies
define trust as ‘‘the extent to which a firm believes
that its exchange partner is honest andror benevo-
lent’’, or some variant thereof. Trust in the partner’s
honesty is a channel member’s belief that one’s
partner is reliable, stands by its word, fulfils promised
role obligations, and is sincere Anderson and Narus,
.1990; Dwyer and Oh, 1987 .
Trust in the partner’s bene˝olence is a channel
member’s belief that its partner is genuinely inter-
ested in one’s interests or welfare and is motivated to
seek joint gains. A benevolent partner subordinates
immediate self-interest for long range group gain
 .Anderson et al., 1987; Crosby et al., 1990 and will
not take unexpected actions that would have a nega-
tive impact on the firm Andaleeb, 1995; Anderson
.and Narus, 1990 .
Despite conceptual agreement for the most part,
studies differ in their operational measurement of
trust. Except for four cases Ganesan, 1994; Geyskens
.and Steenkamp, 1995; Kumar et al., 1995a,b , stud-
ies tend to include one or both aspects of trust in a
single, global, unidimensional measure of trust. Three
studies measure the two facets of trust individually
and then average them into a general measure of
trust Geyskens and Steenkamp, 1995; Kumar et al.,
.1995a,b . All of these studies implicitly agree with
 .Larzelere and Huston 1980, p. 596 who were con-
cerned that ‘‘while benevolence and honesty are
conceptually distinct, they may turn out to be so
intertwined . . . that they are operationally insepara-
 .ble’’. In contrast, Ganesan 1994 investigated the
two facets independently and concluded that the two
facets did demonstrate different relationships with
other variables. One question that remains unan-
swered is whether there are any substantive benefits
from measuring and examining the two facets of
trust in isolation from each other or is a single global
measure adequate.
2.3. Correlates of trust
Amazingly, the studies identified above have ex-
amined over 60 constructs as antecedents and conse-
quences of trust. To systematically review such large
numbers of constructs, meta-analysis studies typi-
cally adopt some categorization typology e.g.,
.Churchill et al., 1985; Tellis, 1988 . For this study,
we will use an adapted version of the political
economy framework Arndt, 1983; Stern and Reve,
.1980 . The original political economy framework
distinguishes between five broad categories of chan-
 .  .nel constructs: 1 external political economy, 2
 .internal economic structure, 3 internal economic
 .processes, 4 internal sociopolitical structure, and
 .5 internal sociopolitical processes.
Since the original political economy framework,
considerable research has been conducted in the
channels area. Some of the original Stern and Reve
 .1980 categories have been more popular than oth-
ers. Besides, a number of new constructs which
cannot easily be accommodated in the original
framework have been explored. To be able to incor-
porate all of the constructs within the categories of
the political economy framework required some
modifications. We replaced the two original cate-
gories of internal economic structure and internal
economic processes with the Dwyer and Welsh
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Table 1
Summary of major empirical trust research
Study Empirical setting Conceptualization of trust Operationalization of Empirical results
trust
Antecedents Consequences
 .1 Andaleeb, Laboratory experiment of 120 Honestyq Satisfaction q
 .  .1991 AMA US business school students Benevolence Stability q
reporting on relationship with Experimental
 .supplier liqueur manipulation
 .2 Andaleeb, Laboratory experiment of 120 Willingness of a firm to rely Honestyq Cooperation q
 .  .1995 IJRM US business school students on the partner’s behaviors, Benevolence Control y
 .and 72 US managers in role especially when those behav- Experimental Influence stance threats
 .of distributor reporting on iors have outcome implica- manipulation of partner y
relationship with supplier tions for the firm bestowing
 .liqueur trust
 .3 Andaleeb et Field study of 88 US suppli- Firm’s willingness to risk in- Honestyq Desire to continue 0
 .al., 1992 ers reporting on relationship volvement and vulnerability Benevolence Satisfaction q
 .  .AMA with distributors OEM in the relationship with the
partner, in which responsibi-
lity is vested in the partner to
act on the firm’s own behalf
in the belief that the decision
will produce positive out-
comes or not produce nega-
tive outcomes for the firm
4 Anderson et Field study of 71 US inde- Willingness to accept short- Benevolence Time allocated to princi-
 .al., 1987 pendent sales agencies re- term dislocations because of 2 items pal q
a .JMR porting on relationships with confidence that such disloca- a not reported
a total of 492 US principals tions will balance out in the
 .electronic components long run
 .  .5 Anderson and Field study of 95 US inde- Firm’s belief that its needs Global scale Age q Perceived continuity q
 .  .Weitz, 1989 pendent sales agents report- will be fulfilled in the future 2 items Communication q Communication q
 .  .MS ing on relationships with a by actions undertaken by the a s0.84 Cultural similarity 0
 .total of 690 US principals partner Goal congruence q
 .  .electronic components Power asymmetry y
 .Reputation of partner q
 .Support by partner q
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 .  .6 Anderson and Field study of 249 US dis- Firm’s belief that partner will Distributor side: Communication q Conflict y
 .  .Narus, 1990 tributor firms and 213 US perform actions that will re- Global scale Cooperation q Satisfaction q
 .JM manufacturer firms reporting sult in positive outcomes for 1 item
on relationship with one an- the firm, as well as not take Manufacturer side:
other cross-section of indus- unexpected actions that Benevolence
.tries would result in negative out- 3 items
comes for the firm a not reported
7 Busch and Laboratory experiment of 132 Honesty Referent power of partner
 .Wilson, 1976 US junior level students re- 4 items q
 .JMR porting on relationship with a not reported Expert power of partner
 .  .salesman life insurance q
 .8 Childers et al., Field study of 80 US agents Belief that the partner will Honestyq Conflict y
 .  .1984 AMA reporting on relationship with carry out its responsibilities Benevolence Cooperation q
 .principals insurance and duties in an honest and 15 items
straightforward manner a s0.94
 .9 Crosby et al., Field study of 151 heads of Confident belief that the part- Honestyq Expertise of partner q Anticipation of future in-
 .  .  .1990 JM US households reporting on ner can be relied upon to Benevolence Similarity 0 teraction q
relationship with agents life behave in such a manner that 7 items Relational selling behav- Sales effectiveness of
.  .  .insurance one’s long-term interests will a s0.89 ior by partner q partner 0
be served
 .  .10–11 Dahlstrom and Field study of 40 Polish, 29 Willingness to rely on part- Benevolence Centralization 0,0,0 Performance q,y,q
 .Nygaard, East-German, and 216 Nor- ner in whom one has confi- 5 items Formalization 0,q,q
1995a,b wegian dealers reporting on dence a s0.80 in Poland
EMAC and relationship with franchisors a s0.62
 .JR , respec- gasoline stations in East Germany
.tively a s0.87 in Norway
 .12 Dion, Field study of 21 US indus- Benevolence Adaptive selling by part- Expertise of partner q
 .  .1991 EMAC trial buyers and 105 US 5 items ner 0 Sales performance of
 .  .salespeople reporting on rela- a s0.94 Similarity q partner q
tionship with one another
 .cross-section of industries
 .13 Dwyer Field study of 157 US deal- A firm’s expectations that Honestyq Centralization y
 .and Oh, 1987 ers reporting on relationship partner desires coordination, Benevolence Formalization q
a . JMR with manufacturers automo- will fulfill its obligations, and 4 items Participation in decision
.  .biles will pull its weight in the a not reported making q
relationship
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 .Table 1 continued
Study Empirical setting Conceptualization of trust Operationalization of Empirical results
trust
Antecedents Consequences
 .14 Ganesan, 1994 Field study of 120 US retail Belief that partner is credible Retailer side: Relationship age 0 Long-term orientation
 .  .JM buyers and 52 US vendors and benevolent Honestyq Specific investments by q
 .supplying to those retailers Benevolence partner q
 .reporting on relationship with 12 items Reputation of partner q
one another department store a s0.89 Satisfaction with previ-
.  .chains Vendor side: ous outcomes q
Honestyq
Benevolence
12 items
a s0.78
15 Geyskens and Field study of 417 small US Belief that partner is honest Honestyq Affective commitment
 .Steenkamp, dealers and 289 small Dutch and benevolent Benevolence q,q
 .1995 EMAC dealers reporting on relation- 10 items Calculative commitment
  .ship with suppliers automo- a s0.92 in the US y,y
.biles a s0.89 in the Nether-
lands
 .16 Field study of 17 US and Belief that partner is willing Honestyq Culture 0Gronhaug and¨
 .European importers reporting to act according to promises Benevolence Dependence yHaugland,
 . . on relationship with Norwe- and joint interests 6 items Experience 01988 EMAC
 .  .gian exporter salmon a s0.69 Formalization y
 .17 John Field study of 99 Norwegian Extent to which firm feels Wholesaler side: Domain consensus q
 .and Reve, wholesalers and 99 Norwe- confident that partner will Honesty Goal compatibility q
 .  .1982 JMR gian retailers reporting on re- adhere to channel decisions 4 items Satisfaction q
lationship with one another and agreements, and informa- a s0.78
 .cross-section of industries tion is shared openly Retailer side:
Honesty
4 items
a s0.71
 .18 Kumar et al., Field study of 417 small US Belief that partner is honest Honestyq Age 0
a .  .1995a JMR dealers and 289 small Dutch and benevolent Benevolence Distributive fairness q
 .dealers reporting on relation- 10 items Procedural fairness q
ship with suppliers automo- a not reported Environmental uncer-
.  .biles tainty y
Outcomes given alterna-
 .tives q
19 Kumar et al., Field study of 417 small US Belief that partner is honest Honestyq Total interdependence
 .  .1995b JMR dealers reporting on relation- and benevolent Benevolence q
ship with suppliers automo- 10 items Interdependence asym-
.  .biles a s0.92 metry y
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 .  .20 Morgan and Field study of 204 US inde- Confidence in partner’s relia- Honesty Communication q Commitment q
 .Hunt, 1994 pendent retailers reporting on bility and integrity 7 items Opportunism of partner Cooperation q
 .  .JM relationship with suppliers a s0.95 y Decision-making uncer-
 .  .  .automobile tires Shared values q tainty y
Functionality of confict
 .q
21 Rose and Laboratory experiment of 56 Honestyq Competitive orientation
 .Young, 1991 US students in role of indus- Benevolence y
 .AMA trial buyers reporting on rela- 4 items
tionship with supplier com- a s0.85
.modity industrial chemical
22 Scheer and Laboratory experiment of 233 Belief that partner can be Honesty Reward vs. penalty influ-
 .Stern, 1992 US MBA students in role of relied on to fulfill its future 4 items ence by partner q
 .JMR marketing manager of dis- obligations and to behave in a s0.86 Contingent vs. noncontin-
tributor company reporting a manner that will serve the gent influence by partner
 .on relationship with supplier firm’s needs and long-term 0
 . medical equipment interests Positively vs. nega-
.tively framed influence
 .by partner q
 .Favorable outcomes q
23 Schurr Laboratory experiment of 103 Belief that partner’s word or Honestyq Distributive bargaining
 .and Ozanne, US industrial buyers report- promise is reliable and that Benevolence y
 .1985 JCR ing on relationship with partner will fulfill its obliga- Experimental Integrative bargaining
 .  .computer programmed sup- tions in an exchange relation- manipulation 0
plier high-tech plugs, socket, ship Mutual self-disclosure
.  .and cable 0
Level of agreement
 .reached q
Attitude toward partner
 .q
Attitude toward loyalty
 .q
Reject partner as too
 .tough y
 .Total concessions 0
 .24 Stern et al., Laboratory experiment of 282 Honestyq Conflict y
 .  .1973 JMR US students in role of manu- Benevolence Superordinate goal 0
 .facturer or wholesaler report- 2 items Exchange-of-persons 0
ing on relationship with one a not reported
another hospital instru-
.ments
a Trust was included in a measure of interorganizational climate or relationship quality. The results are presented for this overall measure.
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 .1985 terms of ‘channel decision structure’ and
‘channel decision influence patterns’. We refer to the
categories of external political economy, internal
sociopolitical structure, and internal sociopolitical
processes using the descriptions put forward by Stern
and Reve, i.e., ‘environmental uncertainty’,
‘powerrdependence patterns’ and ‘sentiments and
actions’, respectively. Given the large and diverse
range of constructs belonging to the latter category,
we split it into two conceptual categories: a ‘senti-
ments’ category, referring to the channel members’
affective responses toward their partner or their rela-
tionship, and an ‘actions’ category, referring to the
patterns of behavior that emerge in a relationship.
Furthermore, consistent with the assertion of Arndt
 .1983, p. 52 that the political economy framework
puts too little emphasis on economic performance,
we included a seventh category of ‘performance’ in
our classification framework cf. John and Reve,
.1982 .
The effect size metric selected for the analysis
was the zero-order Pearson product-moment correla-
tion coefficient between trust and the construct in
question, because it is easily interpretable and scale-
 .free Rosenthal, 1986 . For studies that did not report
correlations, Student’s t and F-ratios with one df in
the numerator were converted to correlation coeffi-
cients by means of formulas given by Hunter and
 .Schmidt 1990, p. 272 . In total, 171 product-mo-
ment correlations involving trust from 26 indepen-
dent samples reported in 23 articles and a total of
4548 subjects of which 3550 were channel members
.and 998 were simulated channel members were
used in the meta-analysis. 2 The number of samples
and data points is similar to the number found in
 .meta-analyses by Sultan et al. 1990 and Szymanski
 .et al. 1995 . All ‘harvested’ pairwise relationships
were categorized according to the underlying con-
struct being associated with trust. In most instances,
this was accomplished by accepting the construct
designation employed in a study. However, in certain
instances it was necessary to infer the appropriate
2  .For one sample Andaleeb et al., 1992 , only the sign of the
results was given. No correlation coefficients, t- or F-ratios were
reported. Consequently, this sample could not be included in the
analyses.
construct category on the basis of the terminology of
the conceptualizations and operationalizations. 3
All 171 correlations involving trust were classi-
fied into one of eight categories, i.e., the seven
categories of the adapted political economy frame-
work, and an eighth category for ‘other’ constructs.
Forty-three correlations could not be classified ac-
cording to the political economy dimensions, mainly
because they referred to intrafirm as opposed to
interfirm characteristics. Each study was indepen-
dently coded for potential conceptual and method-
 .ological moderator variables to be described below
by one of the authors and one other coder. The
average interrater agreement was 97%. Differences
were resolved by discussion with one of the other
authors serving as arbiter. Below, the succinct
overview of the results of the classification is given.
See Table 2 for a summary overview of the correla-
tions reported in the empirical studies. For each
construct, we also indicated whether it is generally
posited in the literature as an antecedent or a conse-
quence of trust.
2.3.1. En˝ironmental uncertainty
The environment has a significant effect on deci-
sion making uncertainty in marketing channel rela-
 .tionships Achrol and Stern, 1988 . As Achrol and
 .Stern 1988 demonstrate, there are a number of
dimensions that contribute to environmental uncer-
tainty. Some studies have examined the general ef-
fects of environmental uncertainty on trust
Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1995b; Kumar et al.,
.1995a . Other studies have investigated the effects of
individual dimensions such as environmental munifi-
cence referring to a rich availability of resources
. sought in inputs and outputs markets Dwyer and
. Oh, 1987 , environmental diversity the degree to
which elements of the environment are heteroge-
3 Some articles contain more than one correlation between trust
 .and a specific construct. For instance, Ganesan 1994 reports
correlations for two measures of dependence. If we included each
correlation as a separate study in the meta-analysis, a dispropor-
tionate weight would be given to this investigation in relation to
studies that only investigated one measure. In resolving this issue,
we followed the basic recommendations of Hunter and Schmidt
 .1990 by averaging the correlations and reporting the data as a
single study.
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Table 2
Overview of pairwise relationships involving trust
c .Category of adapted political Antecedent A or Number of Total sample Weighted Range r ’s
b .economy framework consequence C r ’s size mean r
aw xSpecific construct Study
En˝ironmental uncertainty
w xOverall environmental uncertainty 10,18,20 A 6 1195 y0.210 y0.300 to 0.200
w xEnvironmental volatility 4,14 A 3 664 y0.405 y0.490 to y0.065
w xEnvironmental diversity 14 A 2 172 0.074 0.065 to 0.095
w xEnvironmental munificence 13 A 1 167 0.101 n.a.
Channel decision structure
w xCentralization 4,10,13,22,23 A 7 1255 y0.274 y0.500 to 0.150
w xFormalization 2,10,13,16 A 7 661 y0.076 y0.596 to 0.300
w xParticipation in decision making 13 A 1 167 0.474 n.a.
Channel decision influence patterns
w xCoercive power use 2,6,23 A 4 544 y0.239 y0.519 to y0.035
w xPartner’s coercive power use 6,22 A 3 670 y0.132 y0.306 to 0.137
w xAcquiescence 20 C 1 204 0.451 n.a.
Powerrdependence patterns
w xDependence 2,14,16,19,20 A 7 1002 0.084 y0.460 to 0.167
w xInterdependence asymmetry 4,5,6,19 A 5 2061 y0.055 y0.137 to 0.186
w xPartner’s dependence 14,19 A 3 589 0.248 0.182 to 0.426
w xTotal interdependence 5,19 A 2 1107 y0.031 y0.180 to 0.215
w xTransaction specific investments 14 A 2 172 0.186 0.185 to 0.187
w xPartner’s transaction specific investments 14 A 2 172 0.472 0.464 to 0.475
Actions
w xCooperation 2,6,8,9,20,21 A 8 1145 0.600 0.220 to 0.836
w xCommunication 4,5,6,9,20,23 A 7 2102 0.381 0.080 to 0.589
w xPartner’s support 4,5,10,12 A 6 1572 0.497 y0.110 to 0.640
w xManifest conflict 6,8,18,19,24 C 5 1127 y0.672 y0.820 to y0.228
w xWillingness to invest 18 C 2 706 0.506 0.476 to 0.526
w xFunctionality of conflict 6,20 C 2 453 0.452 0.406 to 0.488
w xPartner’s opportunistic behavior 13,20 A 2 371 y0.647 y0.759 to y0.460
w xExit 20 C 1 204 y0.396 n.a.
Sentiments
w xAffective commitment 14,18,19,20,22,23 C 7 1393 0.590 0.290 to 0.756
w xSatisfaction 6,9,13,17,22,23 C 7 1040 0.675 0.500 to 0.860
w xExpectation of continuity 5,9,18 C 4 1547 0.511 0.290 to 0.590
w xGoal compatibility 5,17,20 A 4 1092 0.622 0.357 to 0.690
w xPartner’s distributive fairness 18 A 2 706 0.432 0.350 to 0.485
w xPartner’s procedural fairness 18 A 2 706 0.711 0.705 to 0.715
w xCalculative commitment 15 C 2 706 y0.285 y0.394 to y0.115
w xDomain consensus 17 A 2 198 0.561 0.489 to 0.625
Performance
Outcomes given comparison levelr A 6 1510 0.430 0.243 to 0.637
w xcomparison level of alternatives 6,18,20,22
w xSatisfaction with previous outcomes 14 A 2 172 0.365 0.326 to 0.452
w xPartner’s sales effectiveness 9 C 1 151 0.255 n.a.
dOther constructs n.a. 43 n.a. 0.243 y0.460 to 0.770
aStudy numbers correspond to those in Table 1.
b Where causal ordering has been subject to debate, the classification is consistent with the majority of distribution channels research.
c
n.a.snot applicable.
d The weighted mean of the absolute values of the correlation coefficients is reported.
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.  .neous and complex Ganesan, 1994 , or environ-
mental volatility the extent to which market and
. demand changes are rapid Anderson et al., 1987;
.Ganesan, 1994 . The effects of environmental uncer-
tainty on trust have usually been negative.
2.3.2. Channel decision structure
 .Dwyer and Welsh 1985 conceive the channel
decision structure as having four dimensions: central-
ization the degree to which decision making is
.concentrated in high levels of the hierarchy , formal-
ization the degree to which internal decision making
.is governed by explicit rules and fixed policies ,
participation the degree of participation in decision
. making , and specialization the extent of task differ-
.entiation . The relationships of the first three of these
dimensions with trust have been explored in past
research. Overall, it was found that trust is adversely
affected by centralization. The results for formaliza-
tion were inconsistent, and participation has only
been included in a single study.
2.3.3. Channel decision influence patterns
Operating within each relationship are the deci-
sion instruments employed to influence and enforce
compliance with the decisions Arndt, 1983; Stern
.and Reve, 1980 . In general, the use of threats
 .Andaleeb, 1995 , penalties, or negatively framed
 .influence strategies Scheer and Stern, 1992 have an
adverse effect on trust. On the other hand, trust
positively affects acquiescence with the marketing
policies of one’s partner, but this relationship has
only been explored in one study.
2.3.4. Powerrdependence patterns
A number of different dependence-type of con-
structs have been related to trust. In general, ‘un-
ilateral’ dependence constructs such as partner’s and
own dependence as well as partner’s and own trans-
action specific investments are positively correlated
 .with trust e.g., Ganesan, 1994 . Other researchers
have combined partner’s and own dependence to
derive the constructs of interdependence asymmetry
andror total interdependence Anderson and Weitz,
1989; Anderson and Narus, 1990; Kumar et al.,
.1995b . On average, interdependence asymmetry and
total interdependence appear to have a small nega-
tive effect on trust, but the variation in correlation
coefficients is considerable.
2.3.5. Actions
As Table 2 indicates, the interest in channel mem-
ber actions or behaviors in relation to trust has been
pervasive and continuing. For example, levels of
trust have been shown to increase as partner support
increases, and as opportunistic behavior by the part-
ner decreases. Trust, on its turn, has a positive
impact on willingness to invest, and a negative effect
on manifest conflict and exit, but the latter relation-
ship has only been investigated in a single study.
Although causal ordering has been debated for com-
munication and cooperation, the preponderance of
conceptual and empirical evidence favors the conclu-
sion that communication and cooperation operate as
antecedents of trust e.g., Anderson and Narus, 1990;
.Crosby et al., 1990 . The rationale is that, when
asked about their trust, channel members give a
present state report; in contrast, channel member
reports on communication and cooperation tap recent
past experiences when the partners in a relationship
have worked together Anderson and Weitz, 1989;
.Anderson and Narus, 1990 . Overall, action variables
seem to have strong relationships with trust.
2.3.6. Sentiments
Channel members’ sentiments concerning their
partners or their relationships have been well-docu-
mented. For example, feelings of goal compatibility,
domain consensus, and fairness have consistently
been shown to increase trust. Greater levels of trust
increase affective commitment and expectations of
continuity, and decrease calculative commitment. The
question of causal ordering has also been debated for
the trust–satisfaction relationship. In line with An-
 .derson and Narus’ 1990, p.46 conceptualization of
satisfaction as ‘‘the focal consequence of working
partnerships’’, we posit satisfaction as a consequence
of trust. Satisfaction is a global evaluation of fulfil-
 .ment in the relation Dwyer and Oh, 1987 , to which
trust may contribute. In general, sentiments are found
to have strong and consistent relationships with trust.
2.3.7. Performance
Performance variables that have been investigated
include outcomes given comparison level Anderson
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.and Narus, 1990 , outcomes given comparison level
 .for alternatives Kumar et al., 1995a , satisfaction
with or favorability of previous performance out-
 .comes Ganesan, 1994; Scheer and Stern, 1992 , and
 .the partner’s sales effectiveness Crosby et al., 1990 .
Most authors have argued that economic perfor-
mance precedes trust e.g., Anderson and Narus,
.1990; Ganesan, 1994; Scheer and Stern, 1992 . In
general, a strong positive effect has been found of
economic performance on trust.
The political economy framework should be seen
as ‘‘an attempt to chart out or classify the total field
of channel interaction’’ in a number of categories
 .Stern and Reve, 1980, p. 53 . Constructs belonging
to the same category are more alike than constructs
belonging to different categories. Since trust itself
belongs to the category of sentiments, we expect that
on a˝erage, it will be more strongly correlated with
other sentiments ˝ariables than with constructs that
belong to the other categories of the adapted politi-
cal economy framework.
2.4. Study characteristics as potential moderator
˝ariables
As indicated above, the effect size varies by the
type of construct involved, with the largest effect
sizes being expected for sentiments constructs. In
addition, study characteristics may be hypothesized
to contribute to variation in effect sizes e.g., Ass-
.mus et al., 1984 . As is typical in meta-analysis, the
coded study characteristics can be categorized as
variables related to measurement and operationaliza-
tion of constructs or to other study design features
 .Farley and Lehmann, 1994 . In our investigation,
we include the operationalization of trust and six
study design features that are often mentioned in the
marketing channels literature as being potentially
detrimental to the generalizability of study results.
The six study design characteristics are the side of
the dyad, type of product, type of sample, reference
frame, number of industries, and national setting.
2.4.1. Side of the dyad, type of product, and type of
sample
The majority of trust studies has solely focused on
the buyer side of the dyad reporting on the seller
 .  .side. Anderson and Narus 1990 , Ganesan 1994 ,
 .to John and Reve 1982 are exceptions in collecting
data from both buyers and suppliers. Approximately
two-thirds of the studies involved consumer product
channels of distribution e.g., Crosby et al., 1990;
.Ganesan, 1994 . Others have examined trust in in-
dustrial product channels e.g., Anderson and Weitz,
.1989; Schurr and Ozanne, 1985 . The type of sample
studied in organizational trust research is quite het-
 . erogeneous, ranging from 1 manufacturers Ander-
.  . son and Narus, 1990 , 2 distributors Anderson and
.  .Narus, 1990; Dwyer and Oh, 1987 , 3 wholesalers
 .  .John and Reve, 1982 , 4 independent sales agen-
cies Anderson et al., 1987; Anderson and Weitz,
.  .  .  .1989 , 5 retailers Ganesan, 1994 , to 6 final
consumers Busch and Wilson, 1976; Crosby et al.,
.1990 . The first five sample types can be categorized
broadly as commercial channel members Stern and
.El-Ansary, 1992, p. 14 , as opposed to the last
sample type which concerns end users. No firm
hypotheses are possible about these three study char-
acteristics. Although side of the dyad, type of prod-
uct, and type of sample are often mentioned as
factors that could potentially limit the generalizabil-
ity of the results, the literature offers no suggestions
as to their likely impact.
2.4.2. Reference frame
While most of the studies are field studies, a
number of studies e.g., Andaleeb, 1995; Scheer and
.Stern, 1992 were conducted under laboratory condi-
tions. Because laboratory experiments permit tighter
control, they might be expected to elicit larger effect
 .sizes than field studies Farley et al., 1981 .
2.4.3. Number of industries
Most empirical studies draw their sample from
one particular industry, mainly the automobile indus-
 .try e.g., Morgan and Hunt, 1994 . However, some
researchers have drawn samples from multiple indus-
tries e.g., Anderson and Narus, 1990; Ganesan,
.1994; John and Reve, 1982 . Multiple industries
yield more variation in the data than a single indus-
try. This should increase the range on the constructs
of interest and consequently have a positive effect on
the magnitude of the correlation coefficient. Hence,
it may be hypothesized that empirical relations of
trust with other constructs are stronger in studies
in˝ol˝ing multiple industries.
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2.4.4. National setting
Most trust correlations are based on data from the
US market, but work has also been done on Euro-
pean data. Cross-cultural comparisons should pro-
vide useful insight for both European and North
 .American researchers Moller and Wilson, 1992 .¨
We expect trust correlations to be stronger in studies
conducted in the US than in individual European
countries. Large countries such as the US are more
culturally heterogeneous. Substantial within-country
differences should result in more variation in the
data and a tendency toward stronger effects than
would be found in smaller and more homogeneous
European countries. In addition, although manage-
ment theories in general and channel theories in
particular may seem to generalize fairly easily across
cultures, ‘‘parameters do not generalize as easily’’
 .Farley and Lehmann, 1994, p. 112 . Since the US is
more heterogeneous than indi˝idual European coun-
tries, we expect larger effect sizes in the US.
2.4.5. Operationalization of trust
Many researchers have included both benevolence
and honesty in their operationalization of trust. Oth-
ers have included only one of these two dimensions
 .e.g., Anderson and Narus, 1990 , or have measured
the construct globally with no reference to any of its
 .facets Anderson and Weitz, 1989 . Theoretical argu-
ments indicate that both dimensions are necessary to
capture the construct of trust. Gi˝en that the content
˝alidity of a trust scale that comprises both bene˝o-
lence and honesty is expected to be higher than
scales using only a single component or global
scales, it is hypothesized that the former type of
operationalization yields stronger relations with
other constructs.
3. Analysis of pairwise relations involving trust
3.1. Procedure
Each sample in our meta-analysis yields more
than one pairwise relationship involving trust. Since
effect sizes calculated for any one sample are typi-
cally correlated, statistical methods that treat them as
independent are inappropriate Raudenbush et al.,
.1988 . To account for the interdependence among
multiple correlation coefficients within studies, we
 .used generalized least squares GLS regression.
Modeling within-sample dependencies using GLS
should lead to more accurate error rates and ensure
that samples that provide more data do not unduly
influence the results.
The dependencies among the correlations are rep-
resented by their variance–covariance matrix. For a
single sample, the asymptotic variances and covari-
ances of the set of correlations involving trust and
another channel construct are Becker, 1992b; Becker
.and Schram, 1994 :
22Var r s 1yr rn , 1 .  . .trust , x trust , x
Cov r ,r .trust , x trust , y
s 0.5 2 r yr r .x , y trust , x trust , y
2 2 2 3= 1yr yr yr qr rn , .trust , x trust , y x , y x y
2 .
where r is the sample correlation between vari-trust, x
ables trust and x, r is the corresponding popu-trust, x
lation correlation, and n is the sample size. The r ’s
are typically estimated by substituting sample values
for the population correlations. 4 The matrix of vari-
ance and covariance values for study i is denoted as
S and the full covariance matrix is denoted as S.i
Correlations from different samples are assumed to
 .be independent Raudenbush et al., 1988 . Therefore,
the structure of S is that of a block diagonal matrix,
with the S stacked along the diagonal. All remain-i
ing elements of S are zero. The error vector has
variance–covariance matrix S, and the estimates for
the linear model can be estimated with the usual
GLS formulas. GLS estimation techniques for meta-
 .analysis are described in detail by Becker 1992a,b
 .and Becker and Schram 1994 .
4 Note that the computation of covariances among correlations
requires not only the correlations which are related, but also other
correlations from the study’s correlation matrix. Busch and Wil-
 .  .  .son 1976 , Schurr and Ozanne 1985 , and Stern et al. 1973 did
not report the data needed to estimate covariances among the
correlations involving trust. Therefore, these studies were omitted
from the GLS analysis. Twenty-three samples reported in 20
articles had sufficient data for the computation of covariances for
the GLS analysis. In total, the GLS analysis used 154 correlations
 .involving trust and a total of 4185 subjects for which variance–
covariance matrices could be obtained.
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3.1.1. Robustness model
The most basic level of empirical generalization
pertains to whether there exists a general relation
between trust and other channel relationship con-
structs, regardless of the ‘design’ variables represent-
ing the construct involved, methodological character-
 .istics, etc. cf. Barwise, 1995 . The robustness of the
pairwise relations across a wide variety of different
constructs and conditions was examined by applying
GLS to a simple model that specifies each individual
correlation r as a function of a common populationi j
correlation a plus error, u :i j
< <r saqu u ;N 0, S . 3 .  .i j i j i j
The errors u are assumed to have an approximatelyi j
multivariate normal distribution with variance–co-
variance matrix S. Note that the absolute value of
the correlation coefficient was used, which is consis-
tent with our focus on the strength of the relation-
ship, regardless of the sign. Given the central role of
trust in channel relations e.g., Dwyer et al., 1987;
.Morgan and Hunt, 1994 , we expect that trust ex-
hibits a robust, generalized relationship with other
channel relationship constructs.
Even when the grand mean effect size is signifi-
cant, that does not imply that the 154 effect sizes are
homogeneous, and that possible variation in effect
sizes is only due to random error. A chi-square
 .homogeneity test Hedges and Olkin, 1985 was
conducted to assess the significance of the variance
in the effect sizes. Heterogeneity indicates that the
grand mean effect size must be considered an a˝er-
age rather than a common correlation value, and that
the variability in effect sizes may be due to modera-
tor variables.
3.1.2. Moderator model
To explain the variance in trust correlations by
substantive and methodological characteristics, we
added the type of construct with which trust is
correlated and the study characteristics discussed
 .above, coded as dummy variables, to Eq. 3 . The
following moderator model was estimated:
< <r sSb C qSg M qu u ;N 0, S , .i j k k l l i j i j
4 .
where r is defined as above, and b and g arei j
vectors of regression coefficients, to be estimated by
 .  .using GLS. C ks1, . . . ,8 , and M ls1, . . . ,7k l
are vectors of dummy variables representing the
following systematic effects: 5
Type of construct
 .C senvironmental uncertainty 1syes; 0sno1
 .C schannel decision structure 1syes; 0sno2
C schannel decision influence patterns3
 .1syes; 0sno
C spowerrdependence patterns4
 .1syes; 0sno
 .C sactions 1syes; 0sno5
 .C ssentiments 1syes; 0sno6
 .C sperformance 1syes; 0sno7
 .C sother constructs 1syes; 0sno8
Methodological characteristics
M sside of the dyad 1s respondents are buyers;1
.0s respondents are sellers
M s type of product distribution channel2
 .1sconsumer; 0s industrial
M s type of sample 1scommercial channel3
.member; 0send user
M s reference frame 1sexperiment; 0s field4
.study
M snumber of industries sampled 1smultiple;5
.0sone
 .M snational setting 1sUSA; 0sEurope6
M soperationalization of trust 1shonesty and7
.benevolence; 0s other scale
3.2. Results
The grand mean of the absolute values of the
correlation coefficients between trust and a variety of
different constructs across different conditions was
 .0.422 p-0.001 . The value of 0.422 is the single
best point estimate of the strength of the relation
between trust and its antecedents and consequences.
This can be considered a medium to large effect size
 .Cohen, 1988 .
Finding a significant generalized correlation be-
tween trust and other constructs does not imply that
the reported correlations are necessarily homoge-
5 Because we included a dummy variable for each construct
 .category, we did not include an intercept in Eq. 3 .
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Fig. 1. Stem-and-leaf display of 154 effect sizes. Note: The first
.three entries are read as 0.84, 0.86 and 0.70.
neous. Fig. 1 gives a stem-and-leaf display of the
 .154 effect sizes r . Even after taking absolute val-
ues, the correlations range from 0.010 to 0.860,
< <indicating that the variation in r is quite large. Thei j
chi-square homogeneity test Becker and Schram,
.1994 indeed revealed that there is a significant
heterogeneity among the 154 trust correlations
 2 . .x 153 s5189.74; p-0.0001 . This was to be
expected because the studies varied in terms of
moderator variables expected to be significantly re-
lated to correlations involving trust, and our concern
is now with the explanation of this heterogeneity. 6
 .The moderator model specified in Eq. 4 was
6 It is informative to compare the grand mean r and the
chi-square homogeneity test from the GLS analysis to the values
that would have been obtained from a weighted least squares
analysis where individual study effects are weighted by an esti-
.mate of the inverse of the variance in which all interdependencies
between correlations within studies are ignored. The average
correlation of the 154 correlations under the assumption of inde-
pendence is 0.399, which is slightly smaller than the value of
0.422 from the GLS analysis. The homogeneity value obtained
2 . under the assumption of independence is x 153 s7925.65 p
.-0.0001 , which is considerably larger than the value of 5189.74
from the GLS analysis. Hence, the results appear more variable
than warranted when the interdependencies are not modeled.
estimated to uncover systematic influences of two
basic categories of variables—viz., the type of con-
struct with which trust is correlated, and study char-
acteristics—on the strength of the correlations in-
volving trust. The estimated regression coefficients
and significance levels are reported in Table 3. As
expected, sentiments were, on average, most strongly
correlated with trust in the partner. With the excep-
tion of the regression coefficients for environmental
uncertainty and channel decision structure, and the
regression coefficients for environmental uncertainty
and ‘other’ constructs, all the other regression coeffi-
cients for the construct categories were significantly
 .different from each other p’s-0.05 .
The magnitude of the correlation coefficient does
not vary as a function of the side of the dyad, type of
product, and type of sample investigated. Contrary to
Table 3
The impact of substantive and methodological characteristics on
 .correlations involving trust ns154
Predictor Unstandardized p
acoefficient
a,gEnvironmental 0.203 -0.001
 .uncertainty b1
aChannel decision 0.213 -0.001
 .structure b2
bChannel decision 0.095 0.082
 .influence patterns b3
cPowerrdependence y0.125 0.020
 .patterns b4
d .Actions b 0.392 -0.0015
e .Sentiments b 0.449 -0.0016
f .Performance b 0.302 -0.0017
g .Other constructs b 0.171 -0.0018
 .Side of dyad g 1
Buyer y0.003 0.926
 .Type of product g 2
Consumer 0.058 0.948
 .Type of sample g 3
Commercial channel member 0.001 0.357
 .Reference frame g4
Experiment 0.035 -0.001
 .Number of industries g 5
Multiple 0.156 0.003
 .National setting g6
USA 0.158 -0.001
 .Operationalization of trust g 7
Honesty and benevolence y0.000 0.991
aCoefficients sharing the same superscript are not significantly
different from one another.
Explained variances0.632.
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Table 4
Subgroup effect sizes by moderator variables
Environmental Channel Channel decision Powerr Actions Sentiments Performance Other constructs
uncertainty decision influence dependence
structure patterns patterns
Buyer vs. seller
ar 0.263 vs. 0.166 0.295 vs. y 0.318 vs. 0.137 0.148 vs. 0.223 0.512 vs. 0.615 0.571 vs. 0.518 0.373 vs. 0.606 0.247 vs. 0.215
N 10 vs. 2 14 vs. 0 8 vs. 1 16 vs. 5 29 vs. 3 25 vs. 5 7 vs. 2 39 vs. 2
Consumer vs.
industrial product
r 0.183 vs. 0.490 0.478 vs. 0.330 0.457 vs. 0.239 0.187 vs. 0.115 0.575 vs. 0.464 0.538 vs. 0.629 0.405 vs. 0.421 0.247 vs. 0.243
N 11 vs. 1 12 vs. 2 3 vs. 6 16 vs. 5 19 vs. 14 23 vs. 7 6 vs. 3 14 vs. 29
Commercial channel
member vs. end user
r 0.258 vs. y 0.295 vs. y 0.295 vs. y 0.155 vs. y 0.519 vs. 0.474 0.570 vs. 0.478 0.424 vs. 0.255 0.228 vs. 0.413
N 12 vs. 0 14 vs. 0 9 vs. 0 21 vs. 0 31 vs. 2 28 vs. 2 8 vs. 1 37 vs. 6
Experiment vs.
field study
r y vs. 0.258 0.498 vs. 0.253 0.405 vs. 0.205 0.117 vs. 0.155 0.367 vs. 0.526 0.605 vs. 0.564 0.331 vs. 0.417 0.232 vs. 0.246
N 0 vs. 12 3 vs. 11 5 vs. 4 2 vs. 19 5 vs. 28 4 vs. 26 1 vs. 8 16 vs. 27
Multiple industries vs.
one industry
r 0.095 vs. 0.287 y vs. 0.295 0.127 vs. 0.415 0.226 vs. 0.133 0.591 vs. 0.499 0.533 vs. 0.572 0.425 vs. 0.403 0.370 vs. 0.235
N 4 vs. 8 0 vs. 14 3 vs. 6 10 vs. 11 7 vs. 26 9 vs. 21 4 vs. 5 7 vs. 36
USA vs. Europe
r 0.301 vs. 0.206 0.358 vs. 0.144 0.295 vs. y 0.153 vs. 0.460 0.521 vs. 0.501 0.604 vs. 0.517 0.393 vs. 0.439 0.257 vs. 0.046
N 7 vs. 5 7 vs. 7 9 vs. 0 20 vs. 1 27 vs. 6 16 vs. 14 7 vs. 2 39 vs. 4
Honesty and benevolence
vs. other trust scale
r 0.198 vs. 0.331 0.370 vs. 0.235 0.400 vs. 0.271 0.200 vs. 0.108 0.561 vs. 0.495 0.538 vs. 0.608 0.402 vs. 0.422 0.186 vs. 0.261
N 7 vs. 5 7 vs. 7 3 vs. 6 15 vs. 6 14 vs. 19 17 vs. 13 5 vs. 4 21 vs. 22
Column
br 0.258 vs. 0.379 0.295 vs. 0.377 0.295 vs. 0.376 0.154 vs. 0.403 0.518 vs. 333 0.567 vs. 0.320 0.411 vs. 0.371 0.243 vs. 0.420
N 12 vs. 159 14 vs. 157 9 vs. 162 21 vs. 150 33 vs. 138 30 vs. 141 9 vs. 162 43 vs. 128
aShould be read as: the average correlation between environmental uncertainty and trust is 0.263 among buyers vs. 0.166 among sellers.
bShould be read as: the average correlation between environmental uncertainty and trust is 0.258 vs. an average correlation of 0.379 for all the other constructs that were
correlated with trust.
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 .Fig. 2. Hypothesized model. Note: Correlations between exogenous variables are not shown.
our expectations, the operationalization of trust also
did not affect the size of the correlation. The effects
 .of reference frame p-0.001 , number of industries
 .  .ps0.003 , and national setting p-0.001 on the
size of trust correlations were statistically significant
and directionally consistent with expectations. The
use of experiments, multiple industries, and US data
tend to produce larger effects than the use of field
studies, a single industry, and European data do.
The meta-analysis explains 63.2% of the variabil-
ity in correlations involving trust, which compares
favorably with the fit of meta-analyses in other areas
 .Farley et al., 1995 . It indicates that a moderator-ad-
justed meta-analytic estimate is substantially more
precise than the grand mean of 0.422.
For illustrative purposes, Table 4 presents
weighted mean correlations after Fisher z-transform
per type of construct and study characteristic. 7, 8
 .Following Cohen 1988 , the average effect sizes
involving sentiments and actions can be regarded as
7 The computation of weighted mean correlations per type of
construct and study characteristic does not require a GLS analysis.
Consequently, Table 4 is again based on the complete set of 171
 .product-moment correlations involving trust cf. Tables 1 and 2 .
8 The average correlation per methodological level is not shown
because it produces misleading results. For example, the average
 .effect size for European studies 0.404 is slightly larger than the
 .effect size for US studies 0.365 although Table 3 indicates the
opposite. This is due to the fact that the European set does not
contain correlations involving powerrdependence and channels
decision influence constructs, and these constructs tend to have
rather low correlations with trust in the first place. In regression
analysis, one controls for all the other variables. Computation of
the column totals presents no serious biasing problems because
the methodological factors did not have large moderating effects.
large, and for economic performance, the effect size
is medium to large. The average effect size for
environmental uncertainty, channel decision struc-
ture, and channel influence patterns is medium, while
the correlations with powerrdependence patterns
tend to be small. Table 4 also shows some gaps in
previous research efforts. For example, there is a
lack of published studies on European data linking
trust to channel decision influence patterns,
powerrdependence patterns, and performance, on
experimental studies incorporating environmental
uncertainty or performance, and on the role of chan-
nel decision structure in the formation of trust among
sellers and end users. Even more striking, there is a
total lack of studies involving trust in non-Western
settings.
4. Causal model analysis
Above, we have concentrated on the analysis of
pairwise relationships involving trust. The assess-
ment of the robustness of the pairwise relations
involving trust is descriptive in scope. In the modera-
tor analysis, the interest is still in descriptiverpredic-
 .tive rather than in explanatory causation, but the
magnitude of the descriptive relation varies across
 .levels of the moderator Shadish, 1996 . The moder-
ator analysis allows one to predict the effect size,
given the correlate involved and the methodological
characteristics of the study.
In this section, we expand the meta-analysis of
previous research on trust by examining explanatory
processes, delineating and testing the role of trust in
a nomological net. Thus, we combine two powerful
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methodologies, structural equation modeling and
meta-analysis, in order to use all available research
evidence to obtain more robust and generalizable
estimates of the nomological relations involving trust
 .Hom et al., 1992 .
We examine the relation between trust and some
of its key antecedents and some of its key conse-
quences and test the mediating role of trust with
respect to the relations between these antecedents
and these consequences. Our causal model is shown
in Fig. 2. 9 Three considerations were made in decid-
ing which constructs to include in our model. First,
the constructs included in the model had to be
theoretically relevant, for example as shown by the
frequency with which they have been related to trust
 .see also Table 2 . Second, a construct could only be
included if a sufficient number of studies relating it
to every other construct in the model was available.
Third, to maximize generalizability, the constructs
are chosen to represent different categories of the
adapted political economy framework.
Antecedents of trust. The model posits antecedent
effects of environmental uncertainty, own depen-
dence, partner’s coercive power use, communication,
and economic outcomes on trust. In the face of high
environmental uncertainty, a channel member wants
to remain flexible and develop relatively temporary
relationships with multiple channel partners and con-
sequently exhibits lower trust in any one partner
9 The constructs commitment and expectation of continuity are
closely related; both pertain to perceptions about the future contin-
 .uance of the relationship. In line with Ganesan 1994 , we collec-
tively refer to these constructs as ‘long-term orientation’. Simi-
larly, outcomes given comparison level outcomes obtained from a
relationship compared with expectations based upon knowledge
.and experience is very similar to outcomes given comparison
level for alternatives outcomes obtained from a relationship
.compared with the best alternative relationship , as outcomes
available from the best alternative relationship are a part of the
firm’s experience and contribute to the firm’s expectations. We
therefore use results for both constructs as measures of ‘economic
outcomes’. Environmental uncertainty, environmental volatility,
environmental diversity and environmental munificence are com-
bined into the summary construct ‘environmental uncertainty’,
since ‘‘uncertainty can be viewed as one outcome of the other
 .environmental dimensions’’ Dwyer and Oh, 1986, p. 195 . The
resulting presumption is, then, the more volatile and diverse and
the less munificent, the more uncertain the environment.
 .Ganesan, 1994; Kumar et al., 1995a . When the
partner firm frequently uses coercive power and
threatens the channel member, either in taking some
actions that it otherwise would not have taken or in
foregoing some other positive outcomes, the channel
member is expected to view its partner as exploita-
tive rather than accommodative Frazier and Sum-
.mers, 1986 , and it will experience lower trust. Com-
munication enhances trust by improving the atmo-
sphere of the dyad and by aligning perceptions and
expectations Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Morgan
.and Hunt, 1994 . A review of past economic out-
comes from the relationship leads to a channel mem-
ber’s assessment of the extent to which the partner
firm will follow through on its current promises. On
the basis of these estimates, the channel member
engages in or refrains from trusting its partner
 .Anderson and Narus, 1990; Scheer and Stern, 1992 .
When economic outcomes are high, the channel
member attributes a good deal of credit to the partner
for achieved outcomes, and the channel member’s
attraction to and trust in the partner will increase.
Conversely, when economic outcomes are low, the
channel member will become frustrated and attribute
blame to the partner firm, leading to decreased trust
 . 10Frazier, 1983b . Although there is no consensus
on whether dependence should increase or decrease
trust, channels researchers agree that dependence,
which is considered to be central to explaining chan-
nel sentiments, is causally antecedent to trust
 .Andaleeb, 1996; Reve and Stern, 1985 . A meta-
analysis by aggregating evidence from several stud-
ies should help establish the sign of the effect.
Consequences of trust. Satisfaction and long-term
orientation are modeled as consequences of trust.
10 Consistent with the best available conceptual and empirical
evidence, economic outcomes are modeled as an antecedent of
trust Anderson and Narus, 1984, 1990; Kumar et al., 1995a,
.1992; Scheer and Stern, 1992 . Other studies suggest that rela-
tional attitudes precede economic outcomes Crosby et al., 1990;
.Ross et al., 1997 . In fact, channel relationships are dynamic, and
thus, feedback relationships should occur with economic outcomes
influencing the parties’ trust, and the accumulation of trust in-
creasing future economic outcomes. Since our data are cross-sec-
tional as opposed to longitudinal, we cannot unequivocally capture
the causal sequence of the constructs. This issue will be taken up
in Section 5.
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Table 5
Average intercorrelations among constructs in the modela
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Trust 0.871
2. Environmental uncertainty y0.261 0.726
3. Own dependence 0.084 y0.066 0.826
4. Partner’s coercive power use y0.132 0.100 0.114 0.818
5. Communication 0.381 y0.166 0.043 0.058 0.844
6. Economic outcomes 0.424 y0.199 0.111 0.067 0.324 0.898
7. Satisfaction 0.675 y0.007 0.147 y0.137 0.314 0.333 0.864
8. Long-term orientation 0.534 y0.174 0.193 y0.192 0.453 0.311 0.472 0.792
a Entries below the diagonal represent meta-analytically derived weighted mean correlations. Entries on the diagonal are weighted mean
Cronbach alpha coefficients.
When a channel member trusts its partner, it will feel
secure by way of an implicit belief that the actions of
the partner will result in positive outcomes or not
result in negative outcomes. This evaluation should
 .lead to high satisfaction Andaleeb, 1996 . In the
longer run, relationships characterized by trust are so
highly valued that parties will desire to commit
themselves to such relationships Ganesan, 1994;
.Morgan and Hunt, 1994 .
The key role of trust. Several authors e.g., Dwyer
.et al., 1987; Morgan and Hunt, 1994 have argued
that trust plays a central role in relationship building
and maintenance. Trust leads to cooperative behav-
iors that are conducive to relationship marketing
 .success. Morgan and Hunt 1994 present a ‘key
mediating variable’ model in which trust is posi-
tioned as a key variable, mediating the relations
between important antecedents e.g., communica-
.  .tion and consequences e.g., conflict . The mediat-
ing role of trust is also implicit in other studies,
examining the relation between various antecedents
and consequences e.g., Anderson and Narus, 1990;
.Ganesan, 1994 . These studies do not suggest that
trust accounts for the total effect of antecedents on
relationship consequences, but that trust acts as an
important mediator.
Critical to establishing the key role of trust in
affecting important relationship outcomes such as
.satisfaction and commitment , is to rule out alterna-
tive explanations. Perhaps the most plausible com-
peting alternative is economic in nature. In this view,
the consequences of trust are best predicted by the
economic outcomes of the relationship and therefore,
trust becomes redundant once the effects of such
economic outcomes are considered. Our causal model
allows us to test this rival view. We believe that
previous research on trust in which economic out-
comes have also been considered, suggests that be-
havioral processes involving trust are crucial to un-
derstand cooperative channel relationship building.
Hence, trust is conceptualized as a key mediator
˝ariable, influencing satisfaction and long-term ori-
entation, e˝en when we control for economic out-
comes and other antecedents.
4.1. Procedure
The set of studies used for the causal model
analysis is not identical to the set of studies used for
the analysis of the pairwise relations. In principle,
any study that reports a correlation between any pair
of constructs specified in Fig. 2 provides information
that can be incorporated in the estimation of the
causal model. 11 On the other hand, some papers
used for the bivariate relations may not contain
correlations with one or more constructs that are
included in the causal model e.g., Busch and Wil-
.son, 1976; Childers et al., 1984 . In total, 43 studies
11 For example, suppose that we wanted to predict trust from
two antecedent variables communication and economic outcomes.
Any study using at least two of these variables would contain at
least one correlation of interest. In order for r totrust,communication
be estimated, there must be at least one study with both trust and
communication; estimation of r re-communication,economic outcomes
quires at least one study with both communication and economic
outcomes. However, there is no need for a study in which all three
 .variables occur together Hunter and Schmidt, 1990, p. 503 .
( )I. Geyskens et al.r Intern. J. of Research in Marketing 15 1998 223–248 241
Table 6
Analysis of the meta-analytical structural equations model
Path coefficients
Independent variable Trust Satisfaction Long-term orientation
b bEnvironmental uncertainty y0.135 0.304 0.050
a b bOwn dependence 0.063 0.120 0.207
b b bPartner’s coercive power use y0.192 y0.101 y0.236
b a bCommunication 0.297 0.063 0.372
bEconomic outcomes 0.339 0.034 0.030
b bTrust 0.808 0.425
2R 0.382 0.702 0.588
( )Indirect effects I.E. ˝ia trust
Antecedents Satisfaction Long-term orientation
I.E. Rel. imp. I.E. I.E. Rel. imp. I.E.
b bEnvironmental uncertainty y0.123 29% y0.065 57%
a aOwn dependence 0.051 30% 0.027 12%
b bPartner’s coercive power use y0.155 61% y0.082 26%
b bCommunication 0.240 79% 0.126 25%
b bEconomic outcomes 0.273 89% 0.144 83%
a p-0.05.
bp-0.001.
provided information for the causal model analysis. 12
The pooled correlation matrix consisting of sample-
size weighted average correlations is portrayed in
Table 5.
The causal model was estimated using LISREL 8.
 .Every construct latent variable is measured by a
single indicator. Error variances for the indicators
 . were fixed at 1ya cf. Anderson and Gerbing,
12 The following studies provided at least one correlation coeffi-
cient: the ‘trust’ studies 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 22, and 23 see Table 1 for the meaning of these study
.  .numbers , and Anderson and Narus 1984 , Anderson and Weitz
 .  .  .1992 , Boyle and Dwyer 1995 , Brown and Frazier 1978 ,
 .  .Brown et al. 1983, 1995a,b , Dwyer 1980 , Dwyer and Gassen-
 .  .  .heimer 1992 , Dwyer and Oh 1986 , Frazier 1983a , Frazier et
 .  .  .al. 1989 , Frazier and Rody 1991 , Frazier and Summers 1986 ,
 .  .  .Ganesan 1993 , Gaski 1986 , Gassenheimer et al. 1994 ,
 .  .Gassenheimer and Ramsey 1994 , Heide and John 1990 , Heide
 .  .  .and Stump 1995 , Hunt and Nevin 1974 , Koenig 1990 ,
 .  .Leuthesser and Kohli 1995 , Lewis and Lambert 1991 , Olsen
 .  .and Granzin 1993 , Ping 1990, 1991, 1995 , Skinner et al.
 .1992 . This latter set of studies was retrieved using the computer
bibliographic search and issue-by-issue searches of the publication
outlets mentioned earlier in the paper.
.1988 , where a is the sample-size-weighted average
reliability across studies for the construct in question.
 .The median sample size ns1214 from the meta-
analysis of relationships among constructs in the
model was used.
4.2. Results
The key mediating variable model depicted in
2 .Fig. 2 yielded an adequate overall model fit: x 1
 .s1.35 ps0.245 , GFIs1.00, CFIs1.00, RM-
SEAs0.017, and RMSRs0.002. The standardized
path coefficients are reported in the top half of Table
6. All antecedents exert a significant effect on trust.
The performance construct ‘economic outcomes’ and
the actions construct ‘communication’ have the
 .greatest positive effect on trust. Own dependence
has a small positive effect on trust. This is consistent
with the analyses of the pairwise relations. Trust is
inversely related to environmental uncertainty and
partner’s coercive power use.
More important for the purposes of our present
study is that trust has a significant effect on satisfac-
( )I. Geyskens et al.r Intern. J. of Research in Marketing 15 1998 223–248242
tion and long-term orientation, even when we control
for the antecedents of trust. This indicates that trust
is not redundant, once economic outcomes are taken
into account. Interestingly, the effect of trust on
satisfaction and long-term orientation is even sub-
stantially larger than the direct effect of economic
 .outcomes which is not significant or any of the
other antecedents. This attests to the key role of trust
in marketing channels.
The mediating role of trust can be examined by
evaluating the statistical significance of the indirect
effects of the antecedents on the consequences via
trust, and the relative magnitude of the indirect effect
of an antecedent with its direct effect. 13
The bottom half of Table 6 provides the indirect
effect of each antecedent on each consequence,
through the mediating role of trust. The mediating
role of trust is significant for each construct. On
average, trust mediates 49% of the effects of envi-
ronmental uncertainty, own dependence, partner’s
coercive power use, communication, and economic
outcomes on satisfaction and long-term orientation.
Thus, strong support is found for the mediating role
of trust in marketing channel relationships.
5. Discussion and conclusions
5.1. Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is
the first quantitative synthesis of previous research in
the marketing channels domain. Our study shows the
potential of meta-analysis for empirical generaliza-
tions in channels research. More specifically, the
paper makes a number of important contributions.
We find that trust exhibits a robust and rather strong
relationship of 0.422 with other channels relationship
constructs under a wide range of different conditions.
This provides quantitative evidence across a wide
13 A problem arises when direct and indirect effects differ in
 .sign. A solution proposed by Alwin and Hauser 1975 is to
consider the absolute value of the effects in studying the relative
importance of the indirect effects. We used the formula:
indirect effect
.
indirect effect q direct effect
range of studies for the contention that trust is
central to relationship marketing e.g., Morgan and
.Hunt, 1994; Takala and Uusitalo, 1996 , and sup-
ports the considerable amount of research attention
devoted to trust in the marketing channels literature.
Second, we identify that the relations with other
constructs observed in the literature are far from
homogeneous. Systematic patterns in the strength of
the correlations could be identified. The constructs
related to trust can be ordered in the following way
in terms of the strength of the relationship with trust:
 .  .  .  .1 sentiments, 2 actions, 3 performance, 4
 .channel decision structure, 5 environmental uncer-
 .tainty, 6 channel decision influence patterns, and
 .7 powerrdependence patterns. These findings sug-
gest that when building trust is an important organi-
zational goal, managerial focus on sentiments such
. as goal compatibility and fairness , actions such as
.communication, opportunistic behavior, and support ,
and economic outcomes may be most effective. In
other words, relationships are not prisoners of the
environment and power structure, but whether trust
develops depends on how parties feel and behave
and on the outcomes developed.
Results also suggest that the use of experiments
and samples drawn from multiple industries tends to
produce larger effects than the use of field studies
and samples drawn from a single industry did, con-
firming our hypotheses. Further, we hypothesized
that US studies yield larger effect sizes than studies
conducted in a European country because the US is
more heterogeneous. This hypothesis was also sup-
ported which suggests that the US is actually quite a
 .good laboratory for the Western world.
Main effects that were not significant are also of
interest. No evidence is found that the relations are
systematically affected by whether the buyer or the
seller was investigated, the sample consisted of com-
mercial channel members or end users, involved
consumer or industrial products, or the operational-
ization of trust included the two facets of honesty
and benevolence or not. This implies that limitations
in the study design may be less detrimental with
respect to yielding generalizable results than some-
times assumed or feared.
Another important contribution of the present
analysis is the potential of our moderator model to
serve as benchmark for future empirical findings
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concerning trust, either for studied or for unstudied
combinations of constructs, situations, etc. It allows
future research to build more explicitly on the accu-
mulated evidence of past studies on trust. More
specifically, it provides a context for interpreting the
results of subsequent investigations by revealing
whether effects are smaller, typical, or larger than
those that were obtained in the area in the past. The
estimated value for a particular correlation is con-
structed by adding the estimates of the appropriate
b and g ’s. When effects deviate substantially fromk l
model predictions, the researcher should try to iden-
tify the causes. To illustrate the computations, the
 .expected population correlation between trust and a
channel decision influence patterns construct C s3
.  .  .1 in a European M s0 field study M s06 4
 .  .among commercial M s1 sellers M s0 in in-3 1
 . dustrial markets M s0 in a single industry M s2 5
.0 which incorporates both honesty and benevolence
 .  .as dimensions of trust M s1 equals 0.095 b q7 3
 .  . 0.035 g y0.000 g s0.130 note that no previ-3 7
ous research has examined the relation involving
trust and channel decision influence patterns in Eu-
.rope .
The estimates provided by the moderator model
can also be used to conduct power analyses for
 .primary data collection Cohen, 1988 . Once the
expected effect size is known, power calculations
can identify with some precision the necessary sam-
ple size to achieve statistical significance in future
research, given the specific setting used. For exam-
ple, for the effect size of 0.130 above, assuming a
p-level of 0.05, and a desired power of 0.50, a
sample size of 227 is minimally needed Cohen,
.1988 . Thus, if the reviewer is to have a 0.50 proba-
bility of rejecting the null hypothesis at ps0.05
when the population effect size is 0.130, he or she
will need a sample of 227 cases. If the desired power
 .is 0.80 as recommended by Cohen, 1988 , the sam-
ple size should be above 459.
Analysis of causal effects involving trust con-
tributed several additional insights. The recent theory
 .of Morgan and Hunt 1994 on the mediating role of
trust proved to be generalizable across the research
stream. Trust is certainly not redundant once its
antecedents, and especially economic outcomes are
taken into account. In fact, the effect of trust on
satisfaction and long-term orientation is larger than
the direct effect of any of its antecedents. Moreover,
the effect of economic outcomes on satisfaction and
long-term orientation is nearly completely mediated
by trust. Building trust is a very effective way to
increase satisfaction and long-term orientation.
A final contribution of the present paper is
methodological. In our model, effect sizes are pooled
within and across studies. Within-study effect sizes
are typically correlated, and statistical methods that
treat them as independent are inappropriate and may
lead to erroneous conclusions Raudenbush et al.,
.1988 . The issue of correlated effect sizes has hith-
erto been ignored in meta-analyses in marketing
e.g., Brown and Peterson, 1993; Brown and Stay-
.man, 1992; Peterson, 1997 . In this paper, we intro-
duce in marketing a procedure to account for the
interdependence of effect sizes within studies. GLS
is a versatile technique that can handle a variety of
different error structures.
5.2. Implications for future research
This meta-analysis opens a variety of future re-
search issues. First, the distinction between trust,
satisfaction, and commitment has not always been
clear in the marketing channels literature. A number
of authors have found these three evaluative con-
structs to be highly similar if not identical concepts,
reflecting a channel member’s generalized positive
affect toward its channel partner e.g., Crosby et al.,
.1990; Dwyer and Oh, 1987; Scheer and Stern, 1992 .
 .  .Andaleeb 1996 , Anderson and Narus 1990 , and
 .Morgan and Hunt 1994 , among others, found trust,
satisfaction, and commitment to be differentially re-
lated to a set of antecedents and consequences, which
implies that the constructs are distinct. Our causal
model results reinforce this by showing a number of
differential relations with other constructs. For exam-
ple, environmental uncertainty has a negative effect
on trust, a nonsignificant effect on long-term orienta-
tion, and a positive effect on satisfaction. Communi-
cation has a large effect on trust and long-term
orientation, but a small effect on satisfaction. Future
research could add value to the contemporary state
of knowledge about channel member trust by distin-
guishing between trust, satisfaction, and commitment
on a conceptual basis and operationalizing them
accordingly.
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Consistent with the political economy approach
and the majority of constructs related to trust in
previous research, our meta-analysis focused on
dyadic relationships between trust and other channel
constructs. However, network theorists e.g., Matt-
.son and Johanson, 1992; Moller and Wilson, 1992¨
argued that, in addition to analyzing dyads, it is
important to examine the position of firms in net-
works of exchange relationships. They recognized
that ‘‘trust is an important concept in the network
 .approach’’ Johanson and Mattson, 1987, p. 44 .
Future research could enrich the present work on
trust—which largely has had a dyadic character—by
considering antecedents and consequences located in
the focal relationship’s embedded network context.
Some potentially useful constructs that might be
related to trust are ‘anticipated constructive effects
on network identity’, ‘anticipated deleterious effects
 .on network identity’ Anderson et al., 1994 , ‘im-
proved market position’, and ‘improved market rela-
 .tions’ Haugland and Reve, 1990 . There are numer-
ous examples that such network effects are poten-
tially very powerful in shaping channel relationships.
When manufacturers such as Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company or Compaq Computer Corporation
aggressively pursue larger, faster growing channels
including mass merchandisers such as Wal-Mart or
category killers such as Circuit City, it infuriates
 .their traditional independent dealers Kumar, 1996 .
In response, these independent dealers start develop-
ing private labels or adding other manufacturers’
brands to their assortment. Similarly, some suppliers
felt that General Motors had betrayed their trust by
allegedly sharing proprietary supplier designs with
competing suppliers. This has resulted in a competi-
tive advantage for Chrysler as automobile suppliers
now present their newest designs first to Chrysler
rather than General Motors. Furthermore, in 1990,
Chrysler was rated lower on trust than Ford Motor
and General Motors by suppliers. Today, Chrysler
ranks higher in supplier trust than its two main
 .competitors Dyer, 1996 .
Table 4 provides a picture of the current state of
knowledge on channel member trust. As such, it
pinpoints gaps in prior research and provides guid-
ance to what kind of studies are likely to add materi-
 .ally to our degree of knowledge Farley et al., 1995 .
For example, our knowledge of channel member
trust is dominated by US distribution channels for
consumer goods within one particular industry. There
is a lack of studies on the role of environmental
uncertainty in the formation of trust among sellers
and end users in distribution channels for industrial
products. Studies on the effects of channel decision
structure and channel decision influence patterns on
trust from the seller’s or the end user’s perspective
are also needed. Moreover, there is a total lack of
research on trust in non-Western settings, including
studies involving emerging markets of Asia, Eastern
Europe, and Latin America, although the construct of
trust also plays an important role in these countries
 .e.g., Fukuyama, 1995 .
The mediating role of trust is not uniform across
the two consequences. For satisfaction, the indirect
effects were on average 58%. The mediating role of
trust with respect to long-term orientation was some-
what less prominent, the average relative importance
of the indirect effects being 41%. One potential
explanation is based on the different time orientation
of the constructs satisfaction and long-term orienta-
tion. Several authors have called satisfaction the
ultimate outcome of marketing channel relationships
 .e.g., Anderson and Narus, 1990 . This is true, if we
take a short-term view of relationships Dwyer et al.,
.1987 . Long-term orientation, on the other hand, is
clearly a long-term relationship outcome Dwyer et
.al., 1987 .
The present data suggest that, over time, the
importance of trust will decrease, whereas the impor-
tance of other key relationship factors such as com-
.munication and power structure will increase. How-
ever, these conclusions are based on cross-sectional
data. In this respect, the present meta-analysis suffers
from the same weakness as the primary studies on
which it is based. There is an urgent need for
longitudinal studies involving the same set of firms
over an extended period of time. Such research
would make a great contribution to our understand-
ing of the process dynamics and the cumulative
effects of individual exchange episodes in establish-
ing long-term relationships. This would make possi-
ble better inferences about the development of chan-
nels constructs over time, their causal sequence, and
feedback effects.
Our review of trust demonstrates that channel
researchers have devoted considerable attention to
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main effects relating trust to various constructs. Given
this, our final recommendation is that future research
should instead explore more complex interactive pat-
terns related to trust. Recently, several papers e.g.,
.Brown et al., 1995b; Mohr et al., 1996 have demon-
strated the effects of interactions on commitment.
Based on this research, it seems that some of the
more promising interactions on trust may be between
economic outcomes and powerrdependence rela-
tions or environmental uncertainty.
Last but not least, it should be noted that meta-
analysis should never be considered a substitute for
 .new primary research Cooper and Hedges, 1994 .
Primary research and meta-analysis are complemen-
tary parts of a programmatic stream of research.
Meta-analysis is based on primary studies, and quan-
titative research synthesis using meta-analysis helps
to ensure that the next wave of primary research
goes in the most illuminating direction. Trust, as our
paper demonstrates, is a critical concept in marketing
channel relationships. Through this meta-analysis,
we have attempted to map out what is known and
what is unknown about the role of trust. We hope
that it provides guidance to those intending to pursue
research on trust in marketing channels.
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